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Abstract: This paper addresses how the experience of emigrating from the UK and 
settling in New Zealand stimulated my interest in masculinity, and how the 
comparative study of masculinities in different social and cultural contexts can enrich 
and broaden an understanding of pākehā masculinities and their complex association 
with national identity.  
 
It was the experience of moving from Scotland to New Zealand in 1979 which led to 
my present interest in gender and especially masculinity (Bannister, 2000; 2002; 
2005; 2006). I should explain at the outset that I am not a trained counsellor, although 
I have received counselling and have also participated in men’s groups that have been 
led by counsellors. My expertise is in media, cultural studies, and music, and as such, 
may seem remote from the concerns of this journal and its readers. However, I believe 
that it is beneficial to consider the wider cultural context in which gender operates, as 
this is inseparable from our lived experience and crucial to the formation of 
subjectivities. In a related manner, theory and practice are intertwined. A fully 
conscious practice is informed by theoretical reflection, and vice versa. 
Media and cultural studies are highly interdisciplinary subjects which use a 
range of themes, approaches, and practices (During, 1993; Goode & Zuberi, 2004; 
Rayner, 2003). There is no one model for ‘doing’ these subjects. My approach in this 
essay is informed by a mixture of autobiographical narrative, critical theory (for 
example, feminism and Marxism), some psychoanalytic concepts, postcolonialism, 
and discourse theory (Crotty, 1998). Key, I think, to all these strands is the theme of 
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identity. Simplistically, autobiography is a mode of identity revealing, however 
partial, and critical and discourse theory are concerned with the social construction of 
identity by power, just as postcolonialism is concerned with national identity, and 
psychoanalysis with personal identity. Moreover, gender and identity formation are 
clearly linked. This justifies a brief excursion into the question of what we mean by 
identity. 
 
Identity 
In my research area, there seem to be two dominant formulations of identity, one of 
which basically critiques the other. The first, which seems closest to a commonsense 
definition, broadly follows from Descartes’ formulation ‘cogito ergo sum’—‘I think 
therefore I am’. This posits identity as essentially separate and distinct—a knowing 
‘self’ in a world of objects that is essentially independent of them: the rational, human 
self—a single, unique, autonomous individual, who has the power through reason to 
control his or her environment and self (Brennan, 2004, pp. 4 and 94; Benjamin, 
1988, pp. 192-193). Freud was the first to significantly challenge this view through 
his discovery of the unconscious. However, Freudian models of identity development 
remain highly dependent on quasi-scientific discourses of objectivity and 
individuation. They emphasise tensions and relations within, rather than between, 
individuals (Benjamin, 1988, p. 29). 
In contrast, postmodernism, social constructionism, and discourse analysis 
posit a multiple, dependent, fragmented subject. They argue that identities are not 
fixed, but are in a continuous process of constitution through interactions with 
environment, culture, and power. They are not selves but subjects, the connotative 
difference being that the latter implies something that is not discrete or bounded, but 
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is continuously impinged on and reshaped by social processes. In its most extreme 
form (e.g., Foucault), the human subject is primarily a product of external power 
relations—not a producer of discourse, but rather produced by it (Foucault, 1984, pp. 
7-9). Or it is “schizoid” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983) a term that should not be 
understood as clinically schizophrenic but rather as anti-Oedipal (chaotic)? Bortle 
(2001) argues that “‘self’ is the residue that results from the intertwining of multiple 
drives that, while seeming to speak with a more or less unified voice, are actually 
anonymous”. 
Emigration and globalisation are two prominent themes in postmodern thought 
about identity. In a global environment where people, commodities, and media are in 
continuous flow, is the notion of single, individual, ‘authentic’ self still relevant? I 
offer both New Zealand and myself as examples. The former is a colony of the British 
Empire, with people heterogeneously and contestedly juggling European, Polynesian, 
and Asian heritages, surely an identity project in progress. And then there is myself, 
born into Scottish middle-class suburbia (although my parents were English), 
groomed as an intellectual/bureaucrat by the Scottish education system, but cast into 
an environment that was disdainful of my accomplishments, initially thinking of 
myself as British, but now, 30 years on, as a ‘Kiwi’. How do such profound changes 
in our ontology occur? 
Finally, gender itself is a player in this identity debate. Generally, the unitary 
concept of rational self is annexed to patriarchy, as implying the superiority of reason 
over feeling, civilisation over nature, self over nature, man over woman (Humm, 
1995, p. 163). And correspondingly, poststructuralist accounts tend to conform to a 
feminist perspective of deconstruction of the fixed identities, universal truths, and the 
grand narratives of masculine, Western thought (Butler, 1990). ‘Feminist theory has 
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... exposed the mystification inherent in the ideal of the autonomous individual ... 
based on the paternal ideal of separation and denial of dependency” (Benjamin, 1988, 
p. 187). As such, the gender researcher needs to state his or her relationship to the 
phenomena they describe or interpret. An objective stance is not appropriate. 
 
Subjective positioning 
I grew up in a middle-class household in Scotland. Both my parents had university 
degrees in science and my father was an academic. Both came from lower-middle to 
working-class backgrounds. We were an ‘upwardly mobile’, nuclear family, living far 
away from our extended families. My father, a ‘scholarship boy’ (Hoggart, 1957, p. 
238) had few male friends, worked hard, and left the emotional and practical 
management of family affairs to my mother. Hence I grew up with an absence of 
contact and interaction with men, a problem unfortunately exacerbated by my father’s 
extended illness with cancer, which he contracted when I was seven (he recovered). 
At the same time, the emotional atmosphere of my home was reserved; for example, 
there was no discussion of my father's condition. I was encouraged to pour my 
energies into schoolwork, and intellectual achievement became the main index of my 
self-esteem, soaring or plummeting according to how I did in examinations.  
A key factor in my interest in gender was the strong matriarchal streak in my 
family background. Certainly in my home, women (mothers) were the dominant 
figures, and this also seems to have been the case in my father’s experience. This 
meant a degree of respect, and even fear, towards women, and a strong intolerance of 
what would now be called sexism. In the public world, things were different, and this 
tension between a feminised domestic and masculinised public sphere, both equal in 
importance, but sometimes totally in conflict with each other’s values, has had a 
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profound impact on me (Holter, 1995, p. 110). Of course, this tension can also be seen 
as a problem in gender relations more generally. It is not just that the public sphere 
values different things—career, achievement, fame—but that men especially may find 
themselves having to balance two profoundly different worldviews.  
‘Masculinity’ as such was not a subject to which I gave much thought. 
Discussion or experience of it was lacking in my home, and seemed similarly 
irrelevant in the broader social environment. When my culture thought of men, it 
thought mainly of the bad behaviour of the lower classes—of ‘hard men’ (Scottish 
slang for working class yobs), football hooligans, pub drunks, and the like. 
Masculinity had nothing to do with me, it seemed. Of course second wave feminism 
also often focused on precisely these stereotypes or the kinds of themes they gave rise 
to, especially violence (Brownmiller, 1975). Imagine my horror when I moved to 
New Zealand and discovered that this preoccupation with physical masculinity and its 
associated homosocial bonhomie (Sedgwick, 1985) was the major feature of the 
cultural landscape.  
The Scotland I knew was a class culture, with a strong division between the 
middle class, which placed a premium on intellectual achievement, and working-class 
culture, which emphasised sport. Even though sport did interest me, it seemed 
obvious to me that working class people (boys) were better at it, as we were regularly 
reminded when our school soccer team was thrashed by teams from ‘rougher’ areas. 
Gender was not such an issue: I attended a comprehensive (co-ed) school in Scotland, 
so I was reasonably used to mixing with girls. Leisure activities were generally mixed 
(in class and gender), especially discos, which were the main focus of my teenage 
socialising. It was normal at these to drink soft drinks and dance to the hits of the day, 
waiting eagerly for the later part of the night when there were slow dances and 
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physical contact.  
In New Zealand I went to a single-sex state school (such schools did not exist 
in Scotland). Although I could have gone to a co-ed school, I was told that they were 
intellectually ‘slack’. So I moved into an almost exclusively male domain—there was 
only one female teacher at the school. From the moment I entered through the Gate of 
Remembrance (for old boys who died in the two world wars), I felt I was moving 
back in time. The culture of the school was very different to Scotland. Masters wore 
gowns and school uniform standards were strictly enforced. Caning was common. 
Rugby was the measure of status among the pupils. Most of the prefects were First 
XV boys, and although as a seventh former I could largely ignore the school 
hierarchy, it was clear that junior students were regularly bullied and that the masters 
tacitly condoned it. There was a strong emphasis on science and against the arts. The 
reason for this, I came to understand, was that the school measured its prestige by the 
number of students it could get into the Otago University Medical School (for which 
high marks in science subjects were a prerequisite).  
Almost every desk in the school was covered in crudely carved penises, which 
the headmaster at assembly euphemistically referred to as ‘Zeppelins’. The boys’ 
main leisure activities, as I understood it, focused around driving their parents’ cars 
(although many had their own) to parties, ‘sinking piss’ (drinking), vomiting 
(‘chundering’) and sex—‘rooting sheilas’ from the girls’ single sex school down the 
road. One boy told me that the Rector (headmaster) was a ‘ram’ who kept unruly 
(meaning liberal) teachers in line by ‘rooting their wives’ (or so he claimed).  
New Zealand, I was often told, was a ‘classless society’ with a proud history 
of egalitarianism. In some senses this seemed to be true. The levels of aggression and 
profanity and obsessive interest in sport that I would have seen in Scotland as working 
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class behaviour were endemic here. Yet the school in fact was hierarchical and its 
prestige was still based on academic excellence. Also I understood that many of the 
boys came from Dunedin’s richest families. And indeed there were few students from 
South Dunedin, which was commonly designated the ‘bodgie’ (lower income) end of 
town. So there was a kind of class division. However the intellectual culture was 
almost purely instrumental—its sole object was to channel the bright boys into Med 
school, irrespective of their suitability to be doctors. Of course, it could be argued that 
Scottish culture was merely enforcing a subtler coercion by means of class.  
In New Zealand society, I saw evidence of a distinctively masculine culture 
operating, for example, at the level of national politics. (I should clarify here that by 
New Zealand society, I basically mean pākehā society, which is the dominant 
culture). Although nominally a democracy, the country seemed to be run by one man, 
Prime Minister Robert Muldoon, who made regular pronouncements about the state of 
the country, excluded journalists from press conferences if he didn’t like their angle, 
and inveighing against ‘trendy lefties’ (intellectuals), ‘beady-eyed’ feminists and 
‘radical’ Māori. His bullying style of personal debate didn’t seem to focus on issues at 
all,but on personal invective, especially against the Leader of the Opposition, Bill 
Rowling, who seemed to be universally regarded as a ‘wimp’. On the face of it, 
pākehā New Zealand culture seemed to me to be peculiarly male-dominated and 
intellectually moribund. Women seemed to be virtually excluded from many areas of 
public life. Many of the nation’s main interests, like rugby, seemed to focus on male-
dominated activity. There were few mixed sex leisure activities.  
New Zealand’s egalitarianism seemed to apply mainly to white pākehā men. It 
was not so much a belief in equality as a belief in sameness: to be a bloke, you needed 
to act like other blokes, play sport, etc. (Sinclair, 1959, p. 274; James & Saville-
 7
Smith, 1994, p. 10). ‘Being a man’ seemed to have a special importance in New 
Zealand that it didn’t have in Scotland. In New Zealand, there is one central 
iconography of masculinity that seemed to dominate the landscape—‘the Kiwi bloke’ 
(Law, Campbell, & Schick, 1999, p. 15)—whereas in Scotland, there is no 
comparable unified figure, probably because of the class basis of that society. Perhaps 
it is further possible to suggest that if in the UK, class divisions are the central 
ideological structure, in New Zealand, gender occupies a similar position (James & 
Saville-Smith, 1994). From my point of view, this was all rather difficult, because I 
was clearly lacking in the kinds of masculine accomplishment that NZ society valued. 
I felt like the ‘New Chum’, a stock figure in early colonial literature of the effete 
intellectual who is comically inept in frontier society (Phillips, 1987, p. 24). 
But perhaps what was the most confusing for me was the encounter between 
the strangeness of my new position as an outsider with the familiarity of many of 
NZ’s cultural institutions—the school with its public school atmosphere, neo-Gothic 
spires, hierarchically-ranked classes and memories of British Empire, the surfeit of 
UK programming on the TV, the plummy voices on the radio—it was all familiar, yet 
strange. My British middle-class upbringing viewed intellectual power and 
achievement, and perhaps also to some degree artistic ability, as supreme. They were 
the cultural capital that gave me ‘the edge’. Certainly these abilities were still useful 
to me—I sailed through University with 1st class Honours, and then got a scholarship 
for a PhD. However, these were not qualities that were much valued in everyday NZ 
society. 
 
Rock music 
I also had some ambivalence about these values—for example, my father was an 
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academic, but he didn’t seem particularly happy. I resolved not to follow him (well, 
not immediately), so I gave up university and became a rock musician! (in fact, I 
pursued both interests together for some years, as student life is not necessarily 
incompatible with playing rock music). I think I imagined that music would allow me 
to escape the strictures of New Zealand society (by becoming successful), as well as 
those of my family background. I was wrong. Rather it forced me to engage at closer 
hand with the culture I was trying to escape from. Rock music is played mainly in 
pubs, which are a bastion of New Zealand male culture. Secondly, the rock music 
world was not the carefree bohemia I had imagined. Punk rock, which was the 
dominant force in the music world I was engaged in, actually had a lot of similarities 
with NZ male culture: it was based around white males, generally valued toughness, 
rawness, and spontaneity, and was generally anti-intellectual as well as intolerant of 
effeminacy (Bannister, 2000). At the same time, the experience—of touring the 
country, playing to audiences that ranged from drunken University students to stoned 
meat workers, getting lost, having the van break down on remote country roads, 
sleeping on other people’s sofas and floors, being chased by Christchurch bootboys—
exposed me to a far wider range of NZ culture than would have been the case if I had 
followed the conventional academic route of going overseas to do postgraduate study. 
It furnished the raw material for my PhD (20 years on!) on pākehā masculinity and 
New Zealand rock music (Bannister, 2002). 
Initially my motive was critical. Many studies of rock and pop culture 
emphasise resistance—that is, the ways that they can provide alternatives to dominant 
social values (subcultural studies, for example; see Hebdige, 1979). In my view, New 
Zealand rock culture was remarkable mainly for the ways it conformed—from pub 
rock with its boozy camaraderie and suspicion or objectification of women, through to 
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punk and alternative rock, which claimed a kind of political correctness through its 
allegiance to groups like university students, fashionable causes like Rock Against 
Racism and Rock Against Sexism, but was in fact as intolerant and homophobic as 
any travelling rugby team. These attitudes seemed reinforced by what appeared to me 
was NZ provincialism—its suspicion of difference and outside influence. Its 
insistence on and anxiety about its own uniqueness seemed to me a crippling form of 
cultural cringe. And it was not difficult to link this to masculinity in the form of 
homosociality, which is precisely an insistence on conformity and a demonisation of 
Other, usually foreign or feminine influences (Sedgwick, 1985). Neither was it 
difficult to find evidence of these themes in other forms of New Zealand culture, from 
the tough masculine provincialism of the ‘sons of Sargeson’, those mainly male 
writers who had formulated a New Zealand identity based around accounts of rural 
working men, ‘the good keen man’, the ‘man alone’ which fed directly into the myth 
of the ‘Kiwi Bloke’, to the harsh minimalist modernism of Colin McCahon’s painting 
(Wevers, 1991, p. 230; Crump, 1960; Mulgan, 1960; Baxter, 1955). All these 
ideologies seem to fit with a model of New Zealand identity that essentially viewed 
itself as unique, separate, impermeable to foreign influence, and isolated from the rest 
of the world—i.e., the very masculinised view of the self as separate and autonomous 
that I set out above. We all know the saying ‘No man is an island’ (Donne), but it 
seemed to me that in New Zealand we were trying hard to disprove it: as if the quest 
for a distinctive national identity necessitated denying the myriad ways in which it 
related to and was influenced by multiple cultures and peoples. Investigating these 
links question helped me start to understand the strange mixture of foreign-ness 
(especially Britishness) and the local that characterises pakeha culture. 
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The colonial legacy 
When I researched local history, what continually struck me was how deeply 
dependent New Zealand had been on the UK, culturally and economically, an 
association that only really began to unravel when Britain joined the EEC (Perry, 
1994, pp. 41-46; Belich, 2001). And this goes back to New Zealand’s colonial history 
as a part of the British Empire, mainly useful for supplying raw materials, primary 
produce and manpower, that is, the functions of a working class (albeit one outside 
the national boundaries). Moreover, pākehā men, it seemed to me, acted the part: they 
exhibited the characteristics of a working-class group: taking pride in teamwork, 
physical and technical accomplishment, disparaging intellect, being ‘matey’; 
suspicious of effeminacy. When there was a war, NZ supplied men to fight; in popular 
discourse, the memory of Gallipoli remains central to the idea of New Zealand’s 
‘coming of age’ as a nation. In peacetime, we supplied meat, wool, timber, dairy, and 
other agricultural products. In Marxist terms, New Zealand functioned in the British 
Empire as a kind of rural proletariat, and there is a body of thought—called ‘world 
systems theory’—that sees colonisation and imperialism as precisely an extension of 
capitalism beyond national boundaries, a project that continues today as a major 
aspect of globalisation (Wallerstein, 1974). The concept seems to knock against the 
idea (or really ideology) that New Zealand is or was a classless society. But perhaps 
this was actually because the real source of power, the real ruling class, was 
somewhere else – i.e., in Britain. Viewed in this light, pākehā masculinity starts to 
look less like simply a dominant group (although they may function in that way in a 
local context) and more like a bit player in a global network of power relations. And 
the ways that pākehā men are supposed to behave show not so much ‘Kiwi pride’ as 
their acceptance of a subordinate position as the workhorses of Empire.  
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One might object at this point that there is little point in taking such a negative 
line. However, it could equally be argued that pākehā need to gain some cultural self-
knowledge in order to move forward—because, I think, there is also a dark side to 
New Zealand identity: in Jungian terms, a shadow. The shadow comes from those 
parts of our socialisation that didn’t work. And it is worth considering here that the 
history of NZ/UK relations has also been one of exploitation. In a colonial network, 
manpower and natural resources are exported and transformed into high end products, 
which are then exported back to the colonies at a profit. Chief among these products is 
culture, which cements the grip of the ruling group by reminding the colonials who’s 
best, and also has the bonus of discouraging the idea that culture (which is essential to 
identity) is something we can do ourselves. This in turn was confirmed to some 
degree by my own cultural prejudices—the British middle class typically think of 
colonials as stupid and uncultured and of colonial life as dull. Hence the cultural 
cringe—that continual anxiety that pākehā culture is inauthentic, that it doesn’t 
measure up on the world stage. This is the dark undercurrent to bold pronouncements 
about ‘Kiwi world beaters’ (usually in sport). And of course, all this is cemented by 
the masculine ideology that holds artistic expression and creativity as effeminate and 
inappropriate for real men. 
At the aural examination for my doctorate I had to field questions from two 
examiners. The latter was absent, but her questions were read out. One was about how 
I located my subjectivity in relation to the subject matter. ‘I don’t know what that 
means myself!’ said the other (present) examiner, a local academic. Grateful as I was 
to him for this truly ‘matey’ let-off, I had to admit that this question had stumped me. 
Perhaps I was as guilty of isolating myself as is the culture I was critiquing; I, too, 
was ‘involved in mankind’ (Donne). It struck me that if I simply blamed pākehā 
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masculinity for its perceived shortcomings, I was ignoring the fact that I was myself a 
white, heterosexual man. So who was I to point to supposed masculinity in others 
while disavowing it in myself? This would be to fall into the old Cartesian dualism 
which says you can separate yourself from the thing you study. An important stage in 
my change was my involvement in a men’s group in Auckland. Although the group 
was not overtly political or ideological in its aims, it had an implicit ideology of 
dissatisfaction with the dominant modes of masculinity in pākehā society, and a 
recognition that they forced men into positions of isolation and mistrust. The main 
activity of the group was basically to talk about one’s emotional life and to foster 
feelings of connection between men on an emotional level. I found the non-
intellectual nature of the group did help me get in touch with my feelings and feel 
closer to men, something of which I had little previous experience. On a personal 
level, it helped me to interpret my own experience of coming to New Zealand in a 
wider frame of reference. 
 
Men’s group 
The reason I had joined the group was because I felt depressed and isolated from 
other men. Of course, my own upbringing had not encouraged me to feel close to 
men, and depression is endemic in the male side of my family—both my father and 
his grandfather—as well as arguably among men in general (Real, 1997, p. 22; Clare, 
2000, pp. 23-24). It seemed to me that at the root of this depression was a sense of 
disconnection. Now clearly the modern world is full of disconnection—from family 
members, from homes (shifting house was considered the norm for academics); from 
work (Marxian alienation); through TV and mass media—all these can disconnect us, 
men and women. But I think the problem can be particularly acute for (some) men 
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because for them, quite simply, to be male is to be disconnected.  
Connection to me means not whether you have broadband or Sky TV or 
whether you read the Guardian, how much you know, or even how many friends you 
have, but rather the sense of being in touch emotionally with yourself and the people 
around you, and of having a place that you belong. Connection is something that 
relates precisely to the ‘feminine’ domestic sphere that is so undervalued in modern 
life.  
There is a large body of theory that deals with the alienating tendencies of 
modernity. Max Weber, for example, identified ‘instrumental rationality’, which 
values efficient process and systematisation above and beyond any social end (Weber, 
1970; Horkheimer, 1994, p. vii; Benjamin, 1978, p. 36). Weber’s main example was 
capitalism—‘an economic system based, not on custom or tradition, but on the 
deliberate and systematic adjustment of economic means to the attainment of the 
objective of pecuniary profit’ (Tawney, 1970, p. 1e). But this idea, when thought of 
more broadly as the most efficient means to an end, can also be applied to other 
modern discourses such as industrialisation, science, and globalisation, and is implicit 
in the dominant achievement rhetoric of our age: ‘go for your goals’, ‘target-setting’, 
‘rationalisation’, etc. Such an approach reduces the complexity of lived social 
relations and experience to a flat plane marked by straight lines leading to various 
goals and aims, conflicts and conquests. It concentrates entirely on the public sphere 
to the exclusion of the private. It has no place for the here and now, but only the past 
and future. It reduces the world to a kind of phantasm (Benjamin, 1988, p. 190).  
Now it might be argued that this has very little to do with masculinity as we 
encounter it in our everyday experience. But this is no more than to say that 
masculinity is highly ideological—that is, it seems natural and normal, but in fact it 
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embodies a set of assumptions that work in favour of the most powerful groups.  
 
The idea of rationalization forms a bridge between intellectual history and the 
history of social and economic relations. It describes the essence of modern 
social practice and thought. It is, in Foucault’s sense, a discourse. My argument 
is that it is a gendered discourse, that the instrumental orientation and 
impersonality that govern modern social organization and thought should be 
understood as masculine ... Thus regardless of woman’s increasing participation 
in the public, productive sphere ... it remains ... a man’s world (Benjamin, 1988, 
pp. 186–187).  
 
The implication is that masculinity in modernity has ceased to be only about the 
behaviour of men. Through its association with discourses of instrumental rationality, 
it has become apparently objective and universal. ‘Ultimately, the large historical 
context, the big picture, is essential for understanding ... ethnographic detail’ 
(Connell, 2000, p. 39). ‘We must pay attention to very large scale structures ... the 
world gender order ... hegemony ... connected with patterns of trade, investment and 
communication, and a transnational business masculinity, institutionally based in 
multinational corporations and global finance markets’, all these in turn historically 
related to Western Imperialist expansion (Connell, 2000, pp. 40-41; see also 
Wallerstein, 1974).  
Masculinity is a very powerful discourse precisely because it is in some 
respects invisible. It is hard to study then, because it is not an object, but rather a way 
of seeing. ‘Most of what has been perceived as universal in the observed system 
(gender or sex) may in fact have been part of the observing system’ (Holter, 1995, p. 
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102).  Conventional empirical scientific studies are not going to tell us much about 
masculinity because it is part of the methodology employed. Similarly then, one can 
start to suspect that studies of men that focus only on ‘how men behave’--issues like 
men and violence, sport, gay men, male bodies—are only showing part of the picture, 
because they focus on the visible. Secondly, such studies tend to be selective. They 
look at groups who are relatively disempowered: working class, Maori, gays. The one 
group that doesn’t get examined are those conducting the study, that is, the ones who 
have the power in the first place.  
This is relevant to New Zealand because our history and our lives have been 
shaped by these forces, starting from our early history as a colony of the British 
Empire. Many of the reasons why we see ourselves the way we do, and even the very 
idea of, say. ‘the Kiwi bloke’ as a dominant stereotype in our society, can be traced 
back to the kinds of global and institutional forces of money and power that were at 
work historically in shaping our nation. It could be argued that we are no longer a 
colony, and no longer have such close links with, say, the UK, in which case we 
might expect the dominant ideologies of our nation to change. But this has not 
occurred. In a 2004 ethnographic and semiotic study comparing concepts of national 
identity in the US, Australia ,and New Zealand for advertising agency Foote Cone & 
Belding, researchers noted the continuing ‘blokiness’ of Kiwi culture: ‘When we 
looked at all the symbols for what is New Zealand ... men and women all bought the 
same ... symbols: rugby, All Blacks, barbecues ... gumboots, tractors ... In America ... 
the female symbols ... apple pie, friendship diaries, are different to the men’s’ 
(Jacqueline Smart of FCB, quoted on Campbell Live). ‘Local’ culture—TV 
programmes, advertising, sport, and writing—continues to identify the local with a 
discourse of white masculinity, even though most New Zealanders live in cities, come 
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from increasingly diverse cultural backgrounds, are not necessarily male, and 
therefore have little in common with this national archetype (Perry, 1994, p. 41; 
Longhurst and Wilson, 1999, p. 218). 
One possible reason for this strange persistence is that the colonial ties of 
Empire have been replaced by those of global capitalism. For example, when we look 
at advertising (which is ironically the most ubiquitous source of representations of 
national identity), we still see the same kinds of images and ideas, the difference 
being that the products being advertised generally come from multinationals: Toyota 
(‘Welcome to our World’), Adidas (Sponsors of the All Blacks), McDonald’s, TV3 
(which is owned by CanWest). Sky TV’s aggressive targeting of a male demographic 
for its sport channels (and its possible effects on Kiwi households) is an example of 
how global finance continually influences the local, often in a retrograde manner. 
Most of our media outlets—newspapers, magazines, radio, and TV—are foreign-
owned. Again it can be objected that this has little to do with counselling issues of 
emotional dysfunction and personal relationships. But if you accept that everybody is 
affected to some degree by their environment, and especially the mass media, for 
models of how to live and who to be, and that we live in an increasingly globalised 
world, then it is no longer possible to isolate counselling issues from the wider 
context of our lived realities.  
 
Conclusion 
I hope that in this article I have placed men’s issues in New Zealand in a larger 
cultural and historical framework. While I acknowledge that it may not be particularly 
applicable in the more interpersonal or counselling situation, I believe that the 
broadening of context that I have attempted is a useful step towards developing 
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research and theorisation of our local context, which is essential for the long term 
growth of counselling and its status in New Zealand.  
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